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Abstract 
The rise of ‘dignity talk’ has led to the concept of human dignity being criticised in 
recent years. Some critics argue that human dignity must either be something we have 
or something we acquire. Others argue that there is no such thing as human dignity 
and people really mean something else when they appeal to it. Both ‘dignity talk’ and 
the criticisms arise from a problematic conception of medical ethics as a legalistic, 
procedural techne. A retrieval of hermeneutical ethics, by contrast, offers a way to 
overcome both the legalism of contemporary ethics and the abuses and criticisms of 
the concept of human dignity. Such an ethics affirms both the inherent dignity of a 
human being as a multidimensional, meaning-seeking, historically-situated, relational 
individual, who desires to live a good life, and the realised sense of her own dignity 
toward which she works. As such, human dignity cannot be reduced to one feature of 
the human, and instead functions both a descriptive category that avoids moralism, 
and as normative category that allows relativity whilst avoiding relativism.  
Introduction 
The concept of human dignity is evidently in crisis. From once being widely accepted 
as the basis and goal of human rights, and as one of the foundational concepts of 
constitutional and international law, the concept of human dignity is being called into 
question. What is more, the criticisms being levelled at it are not unwarranted.  
From once bearing the promise of a new universal ethic in the wake of the 
horrors of the Second World War, human dignity is now facing the charge that it is 
useless. It was several years ago that bioethicist Ruth Macklin first claimed that 
human dignity is a useless concept.1 Macklin’s editorial sparked a flurry of activity 
amongst supporters of the concept of human dignity and its detractors alike. There has 
been a notable increase in publications related to the concept of human dignity, 
especially in the area of bioethics, including high level projects such as that produced 
by the United State’s President’s Council for Bioethics in 2008.2 Nonetheless, despite 
this activity, the jury would appear still to be out regarding the concept of human 
dignity’s efficacy as an ethical category in bioethics, and as the recent multi-
disciplinary conference hosted by the Centre for Bioethics and Emerging 
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Technologies at St Mary’s University College in London demonstrates, interest in the 
problem has yet to wane.  
Therefore, it remains important and necessary to ask the question: is human 
dignity a universally relevant concept, fundamentally valuable to contemporary 
ethical discourse and policy-making, or is it actually useless? Would we in fact be 
better off—would our ethical discourse and ethical decision making be better off—
without the concept of human dignity? 
This contribution will argue that we would not be better off without the concept 
of human dignity, and that the concept of human dignity is of vital importance to 
contemporary ethical discourse, be it bioethical or otherwise. Furthermore, precisely 
because it is of vital importance to our ethical discourse, the concept of human dignity 
is likewise vital to the guidance, formulation, and implementation of public policy.  
That being said, there is a caveat. If a case is to be made for the continued 
relevance of the concept of human dignity, then the criticisms that have been levelled 
at the concept must be taken seriously. The problems in the conception and use of 
human dignity that have plagued the term in recent years, and have led to the present 
crisis in its meaning and relevance, must be addressed. 
Therefore, conscious of this need to take the criticisms seriously, this 
contribution will approach the question of human dignity’s universality or uselessness 
in three steps. First, three of the problems in meaning and usage that any ultimately 
useful concept of human dignity must address will be highlighted. The second step 
will then propose that the critique that rightly highlights the aforementioned problems 
would nevertheless be misguided in calling for human dignity’s dismissal as an 
ethically relevant concept. The section will argue that the call for human dignity’s 
demise is a symptom of a more deep-set methodological crisis in professional ethics. 
In light of this ‘critique of the critique’, the third step will set out one way, amongst 
possible others, in which, through a retrieval of the idea of a hermeneutical ethics, the 
concept of human dignity can be defended as a rich, ‘thick’, and multidimensional 
concept with both descriptive and normative efficacy for contemporary ethics.  
The Critique of the Concept of Human Dignity 
The Problem of ‘Dignity Talk’ 
The first, and most obvious problem, shall be referred to as ‘dignity talk’.  
Dignity talk is where two opposing sides of an ethical dispute both appeal to the 
concept of human dignity to underpin their claims, and, moreover, they make this 
appeal in a manner in which human dignity is not so much an argument, but a weapon 
with which to bludgeon the opposition into submission, an argument ending, self-
evident, normative trump card. Such uses of human dignity present a barrier to 
constructive ethical discourse. Insurmountable polarisations of ethical disagreements 
arise because neither side, having appealed to human dignity to underpin its opposing 
view, could now agree to a compromise position. To do so would be tantamount to at 
best inconsistency and at worst violating the inviolable.   
As Peter Singer has rather wryly put it—and of course Singer is himself quite a 
controversial figure in the debate regarding the relevance of human dignity because he 
argues that it amounts to little more than unjustifiable speciesism3—“Philosophers 
frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect, and worth at the point at which reasons 
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appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last resort of 
those who have run out of arguments.”4 Therefore, if human dignity is going be a 
useful concept, then there need to be arguments that underpin it, that tell us what it is, 
and how it can be useful.  
The next two problems arise when one begins to interrogate what people 
actually mean when they appeal to the concept of human dignity.    
Is Dignity Something Human Beings Have or Something They Acquire? 
There appear to be two distinctly different understandings of the concept of 
human dignity in use in public discourse. On the one hand, there is the idea of human 
dignity as some sort of inviolable, inherent or intrinsic worth or value that is always 
already and ever present in every human person or human being. This can be 
contrasted with, on the other hand, an understanding of human dignity as something 
to aspire to, to obtain, which is the end or fulfilment of one’s humanity.5 This latter 
notion finds itself expressed in such phrases as “living with dignity” or, for that 
matter, “dying with dignity”. The same can be said for the unusual expression, “to 
treat someone with dignity,” which implies, rather peculiarly, either that the way the 
agent behaves is dignified (i.e. worthy behaviour), or that the person being acted upon 
is afforded or attributed dignity (i.e. worth) through the manner in which they are 
treated. In other words, the implication is that dignity is violable, or at the very least 
mutable, based on how one acts or is acted upon. The point is that there is an 
experiential, psychological understanding of human dignity as a conscious sense of 
pride or self-worth, such that an offence to dignity is not an offence to some abstract 
notion of one’s inherent or intrinsic worth, but much more to one’s concrete self-
perception as worthy, as having dignity.6 Steven Pinker, a vocal critic of the concept 
of human dignity, for example, talks about the distinction between third-person 
dignity, which is that kind of abstract, inherent, inviolable worth that we affirm for all 
people, whether they experience it themselves or not, and first-person dignity, a 
conscious sense of one’s own worth and a desire not to be shamed or humiliated, a 
desire not to have everyone see one’s bottom when one wanders down the hospital 
corridor in one of those charming, open-backed gowns.7 In any event, this means that 
in order to defend an ethically useful concept of human dignity, either it must be 
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shown that one of these conceptions is false, or a way must be found to account for 
how human dignity can be both something we already have and something that we 
seek to acquire. 
There Is No Such Thing as Human Dignity 
It may be possible to circumvent the second challenge just identified simply by 
being more specific in one’s choice of terminology to identify whether one is talking 
about dignity as something human beings always already have or as something that 
human beings acquire. The third challenge, however, is far more difficult to 
overcome, because it could mean that in fact there really is no such thing as human 
dignity.     
Herein lies the important core of Ruth Macklin’s critique.8 She argues that 
respect for human dignity just means respect for autonomy and respect for the person, 
and that therefore the concept of dignity is useless. What is important about Macklin’s 
critique, however, is that if one takes it further, by interrogating what people really 
mean when they appeal to human dignity in a fashion consistent with what has been 
described above as ‘dignity talk’, then one might conclude that the concept of human 
dignity is really just a façade; human dignity, because it is a term seemingly endowed 
with a mysterious, normative power thanks to its inclusion in human rights documents 
and national constitutions, is in fact really just representing another claim, such that 
when one argues for a particular course of action based on respect for human dignity, 
one indeed means something else. Macklin mentions autonomy, but one might also 
mention life, or one’s pride, or one’s religious beliefs. In other words, sometimes, 
especially in public discourse, when people say ‘respect human dignity’ they really 
mean respect autonomy, or respect physical human life, or respect my belief that God 
made me, or respect my desire to be respected. And when that is the case, then 
Macklin is right, human dignity may be useless because it masks what people think is 
really at stake, whilst at the same time putting an end to further constructive discourse 
because what they think is really at stake is never actually articulated.  
So, an adequate defence of the concept of human dignity will have to show that 
human dignity cannot simply be reduced to one or other feature of the human person. 
Moreover, it will have to demonstrate that the concept offers something more to ethics 
than any of the individual features alone.  
In light of the above discussion, it should be clear that there are problems with 
contemporary usage of the concept of human dignity. The rise of dignity talk is a 
problem because it means we are more often faced with unconstructive shouting 
matches than with genuinely clear and constructive ethical argumentation. This only 
leads to further polarisation, particularly in the popular press that feeds off this kind of 
conflictual, moralistic rhetoric, leaving policymakers facing the seemingly impossible 
task of creating policy that will not lose them the next election.  
A Methodological Critique of the Critique 
It is one thing to acknowledge the legitimacy of certain criticisms of 
contemporary usage of the concept of human dignity, and quite another to accept the 
proposal that therefore the concept of human dignity should be dismissed from our 
ethical discourse entirely.  
This part proposes that the solution to the problem lies in an examination of the 
underlying methodological assumptions of the critique on human dignity, and indeed 
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more importantly, the assumptions that underlie the kind of use of human dignity that 
these criticisms rightly call into question. In other words, when legal scholars, like 
Mirko Bagaric and James Allan in particular, are concerned that the alleged ‘vacuity’ 
of dignity makes it defunct as a normative moral criterion,9 our question should be, 
should we only be thinking about human dignity as a legalistic normative criterion? 
Saying that human dignity is the basis of human rights does not necessarily mean that 
it therefore has to be a simple, one-dimensional concept by which all rights claims can 
be assessed.  
Has Medicine Really Saved the Life of Ethics? Toulmin Thirty Years On. 
This section begins its analysis of the underlying methodological assumptions by 
way of a brief reflection on a very influential article that was first published almost 
thirty years ago now in 1982 by the late Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin’s article is rather 
boldly titled “How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics” and it is from this that the 
present contribution derives its title. This section’s thesis is that a trend that Toulmin 
identifies in his article as being a positive force ‘saving the life of ethics’ is indeed 
what has led us in part to a new predicament that threatens to ‘end the life’ of ethics, 
and with it, any meaningful notion of human dignity.  
Toulmin argues that the challenges of new developments in medicine in the 
1960s marked a shift in the role of the moral philosopher. Prior to these 
developments, moral philosophy, he argues, was primarily concerned with meta-
ethical questions, like questions about what kinds of issues can or should be called 
moral. What happens after the Second World War, according to Toulmin, is that 
public debate starts getting stuck, much like it is today in many ways, between so-
called relativists on the one hand, who were largely inspired by sociological and 
anthropological research, and dogmatic, usually religiously-inspired absolutists on the 
other hand. In order to resolve these problems, policymakers began to turn to 
professional moral philosophers like Toulmin to help them. Ethicists (as they came to 
be called) were now being asked to find rational ways of settling moral disputes on 
concrete issues. In effect, they were being asked to rediscover casuistry. Toulmin 
argues that this saved the life of ethics by making it relevant and practical, driven by 
phronesis (practical wisdom or prudence) rather than episteme (abstract, systematic 
knowledge).10  
Despite Toulmin’s optimism about the possibility of a revival of situated, 
casuistic ethics that dealt with real people and real relationships in real situations 
instead of with abstracted formal or foundational systems or principles, it would seem 
that, in the pursuit of these ‘rational’ solutions, modern bioethics may have come full 
circle: it has become increasingly expedient to engage a more legalistic discourse and 
a rational moral calculus, such that phronesis, as a practically oriented situational 
ethics to which understanding or theoria might have been seen as integral, has been 
reduced to a sort of foundationalist techne (the application of a process or technique). 
In other words, as both Toulmin and David C. Thomasma have pointed out, as is often 
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the case in the history of philosophy, the pendulum swings backwards and forwards 
between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists.11 At present, it would seem that 
clinical bioethics in particular is dominated by a legalistic foundationalism,12 fuelled 
possibly by a combination of increasingly litigious social contexts on the one hand, 
and the demands of economic productivity and so-called ‘managed care’ on the 
other.13   
This comes about as follows. In an effort to resolve difficult issues, recourse is 
made to what Johan Verstraeten has called a “radical method of avoidance.” That is to 
say, in an effort to find consensus and to find a workable solution to a problem, any 
question of the deeper meaning of the issues—of what, for example, makes the human 
body or free choice, or any other concept, ethically relevant—is put aside, or even 
actively avoided. What one is left with is a “theoretical construction of formal 
procedures”. As Verstraeten says of these procedures, “Their minimal state no longer 
has an ethical basis or function”.14 
In other words, in the name of expediency, ethics tends to become reduced to a 
legalist moral calculus. To put it in Heideggerian terms, calculating thought—a 
weighing of the profit and loss of interests—is favoured over hermeneutical thought, 
over a kind of ethical thinking that takes seriously the existential import and meaning 
of the interpretations that we give to moral behaviour.15  
Thus, whilst Toulmin is right to an extent to say that medicine has saved the life 
of ethics, it is a fairly impoverished form of ethics with which we may be left. 
According to Paul Van Tongeren, ethics is being reduced to techne, and the role of the 
ethicist to that of a technician who comes in with a tool to apply to a given situation 
that will then provide the affected parties with the right answer.16  
Techne and the Critique of Human Dignity 
Now, with this thesis in mind, if one reconsiders the problems highlighted in the 
first part regarding the uses of the concept of human dignity, one sees indeed that 
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many of these problems can be accounted for precisely because the concept of human 
dignity is being expected to function as a basis for a rational moral calculus. This 
applies both to the critics, and those they criticise.  
First, with regard to the problem of dignity talk, human dignity is often used as a 
sort of trump card to put an end to conflicting rights claims. The very recourse to the 
language of human rights itself is often left uninterrogated. It is already symptomatic 
of the kind of moral rational calculus and avoidance of questions of meaning just 
discussed. In these instances, the appeal to dignity is often made because the language 
seems powerful rather than because there is any real interrogation of what such an 
appeal might actually mean to those making it.  
Second, Macklin’s editorial is illustrative of how, once one starts to ask the 
questions that the radical method of avoidance seeks to avoid—questions like, what 
exactly do you mean by human dignity?—one discovers that people can understand it 
to mean different things, or perhaps better put to be relevant and meaningful in 
different ways at different times. To then suggest, however, that dignity is useless, or 
should be dismissed from our discourse is symptomatic of precisely that same kind of 
legalistic reasoning. It misses a crucial point, namely, that the concept of human 
dignity, by its nature as a term intended to refer to the ultimate worth of the human 
person, of necessity invites the more meaning-oriented, hermeneutical questions about 
what it means to be human, what it means to flourish, what it means to live a morally 
good life, and so on. Consequently, the concept of human dignity cannot fit easily into 
the rational calculus paradigm or the paradigm of ethics as techne. The concept of 
human dignity cannot be expected to do the job of a simple one-dimensional criterion 
that would decide beyond doubt the validity of conflicting rights claims. Note, 
however, this is not the same as saying that the concept of human dignity has no 
purpose in contemporary biomedical ethics. On the contrary, as the third part will 
demonstrate, the concept of human dignity still has a vital role to play. 
By way of conclusion to part two of this contribution, then, both the current 
problems in the use of the concept of human dignity in bioethics, and the critique that 
suggests that it is therefore useless and should be dismissed are the result of a 
tendency to reduce ethics to a legalistic moral calculus, a techne, that avoids questions 
of meaning.  The critics continue to operate largely from within the same legalistic 
paradigm as those they criticise.  
A Case for the Concept of Human Dignity: the Retrieval of a Hermeneutical 
Ethics 
So far in this contribution, much of the current use of the concept of human 
dignity in bioethical discourse has been shown to be problematic. Therefore, any 
legitimate case for the continued relevance of the concept of human dignity needs to 
take these challenges into account and come up with a meaningful way to overcome 
them.  
One way that has been proposed to deal with these challenges is simply to do 
away with the concept of human dignity altogether. The previous section has shown, 
however, that such a dismissal of the concept of human dignity is short-sighted. Such 
a dismissal does not deal with the underlying cause of the problem that has led the 
concept of human dignity to be misused in bioethical debates in the first place. That 
is, such a dismissal does not effectively deal with the increasing reduction of ethics to 
a sort of procedural techne, particularly in professional contexts such as ethics 
committees and policymaking bodies, that relies on thin, one-dimensional concepts 
that can be easily inserted into formulaic procedures to resolve ethical disputes.  
What follows is a tentative proposal for how the concept of human dignity might 
still be useful to ethics conditional upon the retrieval of a hermeneutical ethics that 
will overcome the perils of the aforementioned techne.  
Hermeneutical Ethics 
Hermeneutical ethics is based on the presupposition that human beings are 
meaning-seeking and meaning-making beings always already situated in historical 
relationships. Human beings are, if you like, always in the processes of interpreting 
the meaning of events, texts, relationships, and so on for their lives, and, more 
importantly for their sense of self-understanding as living meaningful and purposeful 
lives.17  
Human beings engage in this interpretive practice out of a fundamental desire to 
be good and to live a good life, to live a life that is purposeful and meaningful.18 This, 
too, is an important presupposition of hermeneutical ethics. Precisely because human 
beings want to be good, they interpret meaning when they are faced with moral 
choices or ethical issues. Moreover, it is because of this meaning-making interpretive 
capacity and the desire to live a good, meaningful life that we can even describe 
something as a moral choice or an ethical dilemma in the first place. Human beings 
are moral beings precisely because they have the capacity to reflect on the existential 
meaning of the historical situations in which they find themselves, and of their 
subsequent behaviour.  
Finally, human beings, these meaning-seeking and meaning-making entities that 
want to be good, live in communities of meaning-makers that have already articulated 
meanings and attached value to things. In other words, human beings always interpret 
themselves and their moral behaviour in conversation with articulations of meaning 
and value that precede them or confront them. One might call these already expressed 
meanings and values tradition.19 
Therefore, when people act according to pre-existing (traditional) moral norms, 
or justify their actions in terms of such norms (for example in the case of ‘dignity 
talk’), they do so to the extent that such norms, or indeed their interpretation of the 
meaning of such norms, can be coherently integrated into the narrative self-image that 
they seek to construct through the way they live out their lives. This means that both a 
person’s actions, and the norms he or she invokes to justify these actions can be 
interrogated for the meaning that he or she intends these norms and actions to bestow 
on his or her self-image as a good person.20 In other words, a hermeneutical ethics can 
ask: What do the manifold aspects involved in a particular moral decision or action 
mean for one’s life as a whole? According to Van Tongeren, hermeneutical ethics, 
therefore, aims “to reach, through the appropriation of meaning, a morally meaningful 
and inhabitable world … In doing this, by bringing up the ethical questions that are 
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behind the applied ethical problems, it contributes to the design of a structure of moral 
meaning, where answering so-called applied ethical questions belongs.”21 
Implications for the Concept of Human Dignity 
What are the implications of this understanding of ethics as at least in part a 
hermeneutical enterprise for the concept of human dignity? This contribution argues 
that hermeneutical ethics opens up the possibility of using human dignity not as the 
end of ethical conversation and reflection—the argument settling trump card—but 
indeed as the beginning. Human dignity, by affirming the worth of the 
multidimensional reality that is every human being, is the concept that gives 
expression to the fundamental existential reason for why we bother with ethical 
questions at all, namely, that we all want to feel like our existence is meaningful and 
worthwhile.   
Part one highlighted the problem of how human dignity is sometimes spoken 
about as something that all human beings intrinsically already have, and at other times 
as some sort of acquired sense of self-worth. Critics of the concept of human dignity 
might argue that these two uses are incommensurate. Human dignity has to mean 
either one thing or the other; alternatively we must find a way to distinguish between 
the two senses by using different terms. What follows demonstrates how an 
appreciation of hermeneutical ethics might overcome this problem. Remember, of 
course, that it is perceived as a problem in the first place precisely because the 
paradigm of a rationalistic moral calculus out of which the critique arises, if it is to be 
efficient, requires simple rather than meaning-rich multidimensional concepts to 
function properly. A legalistic ethics resists any kind of ‘both … and’ understanding 
of the world. It does not do grey. It sees things or at least always tries to reduce things 
to black and white because this is easier to manage and less messy. It ‘avoids’ in the 
name of expediency and ‘rationality’ the deeper, thicker questions of meaning that 
morally relevant situations invite.  
Hermeneutical ethics, by contrast, thrives in the messy. Hermeneutical ethics 
recognises that meaning-making for historically situated human beings in relationship 
is fraught with grey areas and limitations, with seemingly impossible choices between 
good and better, and sometimes, more problematically, between bad and worse.  
From this perspective, we can affirm that all human beings already have dignity 
in that they are meaning-making beings who normally desire to live morally good and 
meaningful lives. This does not mean that they do not make mistakes, or that they do 
not sometimes fail. It does, however, affirm the fundamental moral worth of all 
human beings as moral beings, i.e., beings with the potential and arguably the desire 
to reflect on the existential significance of their moral choices. At the same time, a 
hermeneutical ethics affirms that human dignity, as a cognitively and affectively 
experienced sense of one’s own worth, is precisely what the processes of making 
meaning and moral reflection seek to attain. People want to perceive their lives as 
meaningful and purposeful, and, of course, because people are already always 
embedded in relationships with other people, one of necessity needs to articulate the 
meaningfulness, the worth, of all human beings, if one’s own self-understanding as 
worthy, as having dignity, is to have any real validity.22  
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Thus, the idea that the human person both already has inherent dignity as a 
meaning-maker, and strives to acquire dignity through the process of making 
meaning, means that human dignity, instead of being reduced to a one-dimensional 
legalist criterion, becomes an invitation to reflect on the meaningfulness of the 
manifold dimensions of being human, including the meaningfulness of particular 
choices and actions in concrete situations. It invites an ongoing exploration of the 
multidimensional reality of the human person, in all its many and plural facets, as 
morally meaningly, as having worth. In other words, instead of dismissing an appeal 
to human dignity as useless, stupid, or desperate, by conceiving of human dignity both 
as something human beings already objectively have and as something they 
subjectively seek to realise, we are invited to ask how such an appeal to human 
dignity is meaningful, to ask what aspects of the human person as a whole are being 
given priority in our self-understanding and our understanding of others in those 
particular circumstances. What is this person’s operative understanding of the concept 
of human dignity? What are the social influences, mores, and circumstances that may 
have contributed to this understanding of human dignity? And how does this person’s 
operative understanding of human dignity affect and provide subjective justification 
for the moral choices he or she makes, and the behavioural strategies he or she 
undertakes?   
The advantage of such an approach is that it avoids a judgemental moralism, and 
asks us to take seriously the moral meanings that are at stake. Such an approach 
invites us to gain real insight and understanding into the existential nature of the 
moral issues being encountered.23  
This need not mean, however, that human dignity now no longer has any 
normative value. On the contrary, by affirming that all human beings fundamentally 
seek to live a worthy and meaningful life, and seek to realise this desire through their 
moral behaviour, any course of action that makes this impossible, or that seeks the 
affirmation of one person’s self-understanding as dignified at the expense of another’s 
must be called into question and challenged as a morally bad vision of human dignity 
and the moral life.  
At the same time, however, the normativity of human dignity thus understood is 
also more open, in that it makes space for a range of meaningful ways of being a good 
person. It opens the way to a better appreciation of relativity in ethics, without 
abandoning ethics to relativism.  
Finally, such an understanding of human dignity also always reminds us of the 
limitations of our own historically-situated selves to ever fully realise human dignity 
either in our lives or in the world. It reminds us to be humble in our ethical 
deliberations. We are all on this journey together; we are trying to making moral 
sense of an often morally ambiguous historical world, and as such, no matter what we 
decide, we always need to bear in mind that we might be wrong.  
                                                                                                                                      
meaning, e.g. infants, or who have lost that potential, e.g. the minimally conscious. In the case 
of the former, it is precisely because the potential for moral meaning-making is or will be 
present. In the case of the latter, it is because it has been present and a morally meaningful 
existence has been led. I had dignity before I was able to realise it myself; whatever extent to 
which I am able to realise that dignity in my moral life will remain realised even when my 
conscious life, and arguable my biological existence, is over.  
23 See Dietmar Mieth, "Sozialethik als hermeneutische Ethik," Jahrbuch für Christliche 
Sozialwissenschaften 43 (2002): 217-40, 223 and 25. 
Conclusion 
First, it is important that the problems in the way that the concept of human 
dignity is sometimes employed in bioethical discourse today be acknowledged. 
Second, if meaningful solutions to the problems are to be found, they need to be 
approached from a fundamental reappraisal of how ‘ethics’ should be done. When 
such as critical reappraisal is undertaken, as in this contribution, one sees that many of 
the problems in the usage of the concept of human dignity can be accounted for due to 
the dominance of an understanding of ethics as a legalistic rational moral calculus that 
avoids deeper questions of meaning. Finally, through the proposed retrieval of the 
idea of ethics as at least in part a hermeneutical enterprise, founded on a conception of 
the human person as a multidimensional, meaning-seeking and meaning-making 
relational being, a future is opened up for a rich, multidimensional understanding of 
human dignity that invites us to enter into deeper reflection on the existential meaning 
of our lives.  
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